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1. Introduction 
A principled analysis of the nature and role of higher-order notions within logic pro- 
gramming appears to be absent from the literature on this programming paradigm. Some 
attempts, such as those in [34], have been made to realize higher-order features akin to 
those in functional programming languages, and have even been incorporated into most 
existing versions of the language Prolog. These at tempts are, however, unsatisfactory from 
two perspectives. First, they have relied on the use of ad hoc mechanisms and hence are 
at variance with one of the strengths of logic programming, namely its basis in logic. Sec- 
ond, t hey have not taken full cognizance of t he difference between the functional and logic 
programming paradigms and, consequently, of potential differences between higher-order 
notions in these paradigms. 
Towards filling this lacuna, this paper initiates investigations into a logical basis for 
higher-order features in logic programming. The principal concern here is that of describing 
an extension to Horn clauses [33], the basis of languages such as Prolog [32], by using a 
higher-order logic. The use of the term "extension" clearly signifies that there is some 
character of Horn clauses that is to be retained. This character may most conveniently be 
enunciated in the context of a generalized version of Horn clauses that is, in some senses, 
closer to actual realizations of logic programming. Letting A represent an atomic formula, 
we identify goal formulas as those given by the rule 
and definite sentences as the universal closure of atomic formulas and of formulas of the 
form G > A; the symbol G is used in each case as a syntactic variable for a goal formula. 
These formulas are related to Horn clauses in the following sense: Within the framework 
of classical first-order logic, the negation of a goal formula is equivalent to a set of negative 
Horn clauses and, similarly, a definite sentence is equivalent to a set of positive Horn 
clauses. Now, if P is a set of definite sentences and t denotes provability in (classical) 
first-order logic, then the following properties may be noted: 
(i) P t- 3xG only if there is a term t such that P t G[t/x] , where G[t/x] represents the 
result of substituting t for all the free occurrences of x in G. 
(ii) P t- G1 V G2 only if P t- GI or P t- G2. 
(iii) P I- G1 A G2 only if P I- G1 and P t- G2. 
(iv) If A is an atomic formula, then P t A only if either (a) A is a substitution instance of 
a formula in P, or (b) there is a substitution instance of the form G > A of a definite 
sentence in P such that P I- G. 
While the converse of each property above follows from the meanings of the logical 
connectives and quantifiers, these properties themselves are a consequence of the special 
structure of goal formulas and definite sentences. The importance of these properties is in 
the role they play in the computational interpretation accorded to these formulas. Logic 
programming is based on construing a collection, P, of definite sentences as a program 
and a goal formula, G, as a query. The idea of a computation in this context is that of 
constructing a proof of the existential closure of G from P and, if this process is successful, 
of extracting from this proof a substitution instance of G that is provable from P. The 
consistency of this view is apparently dependent on (i). In a more fine-grained analysis, 
(i)-(iv) collectively support a feature of importance to logic programming, namely the 
ability to construe each formula as contributing to the specification of a search, the na- 
ture of the search being described through the use of logical connectives and quantifiers. 
Thus, (ii) and (iii) permit the interpretation of the propositional connectives V and A as 
primitives for specifying non-deterministic or and and branches in a search, and (i) war- 
rants the conception of the existential quantifier as the means for describing an infinite 
(non-deterministic) or branch where the branches are parameterized by the set of terms. 
Similarly, (iv) permits us to interpret a definite sentence as partially defining a procedure: 
For instance, the formula G > A corresponds to the description that an attempt to solve a 
procedure whose name is the predicate head of A may be made by trying to solve the goal 
G. As a final observation, we see that (i)-(iv) readily yield a proof procedure, closely re- 
lated to SLD-resolution [2], that, in fact, forms the computational machinery for realizing 
this programming paradigm. 
The properties discussed above thus appear to play a central role in the context of 
logic programming, and it is desirable to retain these while extending the formulas under- 
lying this programming paradigm. This paper provides one such extension. The formulas 
described here may, in an informal sense, be characterized as those obtained from first- 
order goal formulas and definite sentences by supplanting first-order terms with the terms 
of a typed A-calculus and by permitting quantification over function and predicate sym- 
bols. These formulas provide for higher-order features of two distinct kinds within logic 
programming. The first arises out of the presence of predicate variables. Given the cor- 
respondence between predicates and procedures in logic programming, this facilitates the 
writing of procedures that take other procedures as arguments, a style of programming 
often referred to as higher-order programming. Occurrences of predicate variables are re- 
stricted and so also are the appearances of logical connectives in terms, but the restrictions 
are well motivated from a programming perspective. They may, in fact, be informally un- 
derstood as follows. First, the name of a procedure defined by a definite sentence, i. e. the 
head of A in a formula of the form G > A, must not be a variable. Second, only those 
logical connectives that may appear in the top-level logical structure of a goal formula are 
permitted in terms; the picture here is that when a predicate variable in the body of a pro- 
cedure declaration is instantiated, the result is expected to be a legitimate goal formula or 
query. The quantification over predicate variables that is permitted and the corresponding 
enrichment to the term structure are however sufficient to allow a direct emulation within 
logic programming of various higher-order functions (such as the map and reduce functions 
of Lisp) that have been found to be useful in the functional programming context. 
The second, and truly novel, feature of our extension is the provision of A-terms 
as data structures. There has been a growing interest in recent years in programming 
environments in which complex syntactic objects such as formulas, programs and proofs 
can be represented and manipulated easily [6, 11, 311. In developing environments of 
this kind, programming languages that facilitate the represent ation and manipulation of 
these kinds of objects play a fundamental role. As is evident from the arguments provided 
elsewhere [16, 22, 30, 281, the representation of objects involving the notion of binding, 
i.e. objects such as formulas, programs and proofs, is best achieved through the use of a 
term language based on the A-calculus. The task of reasoning about such objects in turn 
places an emphasis on a programming paradigm that provides primitives for examining 
the structure of A-terms and that also supports the notion of search in an intrinsic way. 
Although the logic programming paradigm is a natural choice from the latter perspective, 
there is a need to enrich the data structures of a language such as Prolog before it is 
genuinely useful as a "metalanguage". The analysis in this paper provides for a language 
with such an enrichment and consequently leads to a language that potentially has several 
novel applications. Detailed experiments in some of the application realms show that this 
potential is in fact borne out. The interested reader may refer, for instance, to [7, 13, 20, 
22, 25, 291 for the results of these experiments. 
It should be mentioned that the extension to first-order Horn clauses described in 
this paper is not the only one possible that preserves the spirit of properties (i)-(iv). 
The primary aim here is that of examining the nature and role of higher-order notions 
within logic programming and this underlies the focus on enriching only the nature of 
quantification within (first-order) Horn clauses. It is possible, however, to consider other 
enrichments to the logical structure of these formulas, perhaps after explaining what it 
means to preserve the spirit of properties (i)-(iv) if a richer set of connectives is involved. 
Such a task is undertaken in [23]. Briefly, a proof-theoretic criterion is presented therein 
for determining when a logical language provides the basis for logic programming and 
this is used to describe a family of extensions to first-order Horn clauses. The "richest" 
extension described in [23] replaces definite sentences by a class of formulas called higher- 
order hereditary Harrop or hohh formulas. The higher-order definite sentences of this paper 
are a subclass of the latter class of formulas. Further, the use of hohh formulas provides 
for notions such as modules, abstract data types and lexical scoping in addition to higher- 
order features within logic programming. There is, however, a significant distinction to 
be made between the theory of the higher-order Horn clauses presented in this paper and 
of the hohh formulas presented in [23]. The distinction, expressed informally, is that the 
programming interpretation of higher-order definite sentences accords well with classical 
logic, whereas a shift to intuitionistic logic is required in the context of hohh formulas. 
This shift in semantic commitment may not be acceptable in some applications of logic 
programming. Despite this difference, it is to be noted that several of the proof-theoretic 
techniques presented in this paper have been generalized and utilized in [23]. It is in fact 
a perceived generality of these techniques that justifies their detailed presentation here. 
This rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the 
higher-order logic used in this paper, summarizing several necessary logical notions in the 
process. The axiomatization presented here for the logic is in the style of Gentzen [9]. The 
use of a sequent calculus, although unusual in the literature on logic programming (see [4] 
for an exception), has several advantages. One advantage is the simplification of proof- 
theoretic discussions that we hope this paper demonstrates. In another direction, it is the 
casting of our arguments within such a calculus that has been instrumental in the discovery 
of the "essential" character of logic programming and thereby in the description of further 
logical extensions to it [IS, 231. In Section 3, we outline the classes of formulas within this 
logic that are our generalizations to first-order goal formulas and definite sentences. Section 
4 is devoted to showing that these formulas satisfy properties (i)-(iv) above when I- is 
interpreted as provability in the higher-order logic. The main problem here is the presence 
of predicate variables; substitutions for these kinds of variables may, in general, alter the 
logical structure of formulas in which they appear and thus complicate the nature of proofs. 
Fortunately, as we show in the first part of Section 4, predicate variable substitutions can 
be tightly constrained in the context of our higher-order formulas. This result is then 
used to show that these formulas provide a satisfactory basis for a logic programming 
language. In Section 5 we describe a theorem-proving procedure that provides the basis 
for an interpreter for such a language. This procedure interweaves higher-order unification 
[15] with backchaining and goal reductions and constitutes a higher-order generalization 
to SLD-resolution. These results have been used to describe a logic programming language 
called XProlog. A presentation of this language is beyond the scope of this paper but may 
be found in [21, 25, 271. 
2. A Higher-Order Logic 
The higher-order logic used in this paper is derived from Church's formulation of the 
simple theory of types [5] principally by the exclusion of the axioms concerning infinity, 
choice, extensionality and description. Church's logic is particularly suited to our purposes 
since it is obtained by superimposing logical notions over the calculus of A-conversion. Our 
omission of certain axioms is based on a desire for a logic that generalizes first-order logic 
by providing a stronger notion of a variable and a term, but at the same time encompasses 
only the most primitive logical notions that are relevant in this context; only these notions 
appear to be of consequence from the perspective of computational applications. Our logic 
is closely related to that of [I], the only real differences being the inclusion of q-conversion 
as a rule of inference and the incorporation of a larger number of propositional connectives 
and quantifiers as primitives. We describe this logic below, simultaneously introducing the 
logical vocabulary used in the rest of the paper. 
The Language. The language used is based on a typed A-calculus. The types in 
this context are determined by a set S of sorts, that contains at least the sort o and 
one other sort, and by a set C of type constructors each member of which has a unique 
positive arity: The class of types is then the smallest collection that includes (i) every 
sort, (ii) ( c  a1 . . . a,), for every c E C of arity n and every 01,. . . ,a, that are types, and 
(iii) (a + ,B) for every a and p that are types. We refer to the types obtained by virtue 
of (i) and (ii) as atomic  types and to those obtained by virtue of (iii) as funct ion  types. 
In an informal sense, each type may be construed as corresponding to a set of objects. 
Understood in this manner, (al + a2) corresponds to the collection of functions each of 
whose domain and range is determined by al and a 2 ,  respectively. In writing types, the 
convention that + associates to the right is often used to omit parentheses. In this paper, 
the letters a and ,B are used, perhaps with subscripts, as syntactic variables for types. An 
arbitrary type is occasionally depicted by an expression of the form (al + . . + a, + ,B) 
where ,B is assumed to be an atomic type. When a type is displayed in this form, we refer 
to cu l ,  . . . , a, as its argument types and to ,B as its target type. The use of such a notation 
for atomic types is justified by the convention that the argument types may be an empty 
sequence. 
We now assume that we are provided with a denumerable set, Var,, of variables for 
each type a, and with a collection of constants of arbitrary given types, such that the 
subcollection at each type a is denumerable and disjoint from Var,. The latter collection 
is assumed to contain at least one member of each type, and to include the following infinite 
list of symbols called the logical constants: T of type o, N of type o -+ o, A, V and > of 
type o -+ o + o, and, for each a, C and II of type ( a  + o) -+ o. The remaining constants 
are referred to as parameters. The class of formulas or t e rms  is then defined inductively 
as follows: 
(i) A variable or a constant of type a is a formula of type a .  
(ii) If x is a variable of type a1 and F is a formula of type a 2  then [Ax.F] is a formula of 
type a1 --+ a 2 ,  and is referred to as an abstraction that binds x and whose scope is F. 
(iii) If Fl is a formula of type al -+ a 2  and F2 is a formula of type a1 then [Fl F2], referred 
to as the application of Fl to F 2 ,  is a formula of type a 2 .  
Certain conventions concerning formulas are employed in this paper. First, lower-case 
letters are used, perhaps with subscripts, to denote formulas that are variables; such a 
usage may occur at the level of either the object or the meta language. Similarly, upper- 
case letters are used to denote parameters at the object level and arbitrary formulas in 
the meta language. Second, in the interest of readability, the brackets that surround 
expressions formed by virtue of (ii) and (iii) above are often omitted. These may be 
restored by using the conventions that abstraction is right associative, application is left 
associative and application has smaller scope than abstraction. Finally, although each 
formula is specified only in conjunction with a type, the types of formulas are seldom 
explicitly mentioned. Such omissions are justified on the basis that the types are either 
inferable from the context or inessential to the discussion at hand. 
The rules of formation serve to identify the well-formed subparts of each formula. 
Specifically, G is said to occur in, or to be a subformula  of, F if (a) G is F, or (b) F 
is Xx.Fl and G occurs in Fl, or (c) F is [Fl F2] and G occurs in either Fl or F2. An 
occurrence of a variable x in F is either bound or free depending on whether it is or is not 
an occurrence in the scope of an abstraction that binds x. x is a bound (free) variable of F 
if it has at least one bound (free) occurrence in F .  F is a closed formula just in case it has 
no free variables. We write F ( F )  to denote the set of free variables of F. This notation is 
generalized to sets of formulas and sets of pairs of formulas in the following way: F(D)  is 
U{F(F) I F E 2)) if D is a set of formulas and U{F(Fl) U F(F2) I (Fl , F2) E D) if 2) is a 
set of pairs of formulas. 
The type o has a special significance. Formulas of this type correspond to propositions, 
and a formula of type a1 + - - . + a, + o is a predicate of n arguments whose i th  
argument is of type ai. In accordance with the informal interpretation of types, predicates 
may be thought of as representing sets of n-tuples or relations. The logical constants are 
intended to be interpreted in the following manner: T corresponds to the tautologous 
proposition, the (proposi t ional)  connect ives -, V ,  A, and > correspond, respectively, to 
negation, disjunction, conjunction, and implication, and the family of constants C and I 
are, respectively, existential and universal quantifiers, viewed as propositional functions of 
propositional functions. There are certain notational conventions pertaining to the logical 
constants that find use below. First, disjunction, conjunction and implication are written 
as infix operations; e.g. [V F G] is usually written as [ F V  GI. Second, the expressions [3x.F] 
and px.  F] serve as abbreviations for [C Ax. F] and [II Ax. F]; these abbreviations illustrate 
the use of C and ll along with abstractions to create the operations of existential and 
universal quantification familiar in the context of first-order logic. Finally 2 is sometimes 
used as an abbreviation for a sequence of variables XI , .  . . , x,. In such cases, the expression 
35.F serves as a shorthand for 3x1. . . . 3xn.F. Similar interpretations are to be bestowed 
upon V2.F and X2.F. 
The Calculus of A-Conversion. In the interpretation intended for the language, A is 
to correspond to the abstraction operation and juxtaposition to the operation of function 
application. These intentions are formalized by the rules of A-conversion. To define these 
rules, we need the operation of replacing all free occurrences of a variable x in the formula 
F by a formula G of the same type as x. This operation is denoted by S& F and may be 
made explicit as follows: 
(i) If F is a variable or a constant, then Sz F is G if F is x and F otherwise. 
(ii) If F is of the form Ay.C, then S& F is F if y is x and Ay.SZi; F otherwise. 
(iii) If F is of the form [C Dl, then S& F = [(Sz C) (S& D)]. 
In performing this operation of replacement, there is the danger that the free variables of 
G become bound inadvertently. The term "G is free for x in F" describes the situations in 
which the operation is logically correct, i.e. those situations where x does not occur free in 
the scope of an abstraction in F that binds a free variable of G. The rules of a-conversion, 
p-conversion and q -conversion are then, respectively, the following operations on formulas: 
(1) Replacing a subformula Ax.F by Ay.S; F provided y is free for x in F and y is not 
free in F .  
(2) Replacing a subformula [Ax.F] G by Sz F provided G is free for x in F and vice versa. 
(3) Replacing a subformula Ax.[F x] by F provided x is not free in F and vice versa. 
The rules above, collectively referred to as the A-conversion rules, are used to define 
the following relations on formulas. 
2.1. Definition. F A-conv (p-conv, =) G just in case there is a sequence of applications 
of the A-conversion (respectively a- and p-conversion, a-conversion) rules that transforms 
F into G. 
The three relations thus defined are evidently equivalence relations. They correspond, in 
fact, to notions of equality between formulas based on the following informal interpretation 
of the A-conversion rules: a-conversion asserts that the choice of name for the variable 
bound by an abstraction is unimportant, p-conversion relates an application to the result 
of evaluating the application, and q-conversion describes a weak notion of extensionality 
for formulas. In this paper we use the strongest of these notions, i.e. we consider F and G 
equal just in case F A-conv G. There are certain distinctions to be made between formulas 
by omitting the rules of 7-conversion, but we feel that these are not important in our 
context. 
A formula F is said to be a p-normal form if it does not have a subformula of the 
form [Ax.A] B, and a A-normal form if, in addition, it does not have a subformula of the 
form Ax.[A x] with x not occurring free in A. If F is a p-normal form (A-normal form) 
and G p-conv (X-conv) F, then F is said to be a p-normal (X-normal) form of G. From 
the Church-Rosser Theorem, described in, e.g., [3] for a X-calculus without type symbols 
but applicable to the language under consideration as well, it follows that a @-normal 
(X-normal) form of a formula is unique up to a renaming of bound variables. Further, 
it is known [I, 81 that a @-normal form exists for every formula in the typed X-calculus; 
this may be obtained by repeatedly replacing subformulas of the form [Ax. A] B by Sg A, 
preceded, perhaps, by some a-conversion steps. Such a formula may be converted into a 
X-normal form by replacing each subformula of the form Xx.[A x] where x does not occur 
free in A by A. In summary, any formula F may be converted into a X-normal form that 
is unique up to a-conversions. We denote such a form by Xnorm(F). Occasionally, we 
need to talk of a unique normal form and, in such cases, we use p(F) to designate what we 
call the principal normal form of F .  Determining this form essentially requires a naming 
convention for bound variables and a convention such as that in [I] will suffice for our 
purposes. 
The existence of a X-normal form for each formula provides a mechanism for deter- 
mining whether two formulas are equal by virtue of the X-conversion rules. These normal 
forms also facilitate the discussion of properties of formulas in terms of a representative for 
each of the equivalence classes that has a convenient structure. In this context, we note 
that a @-normal form is a formula that has the structure 
where A is a constant or variable, and, for 1 5 i 5 m, Fi also has the same form. We 
refer to the sequence xl , . . . , x, as the binder, to A as the head and to Fly .. . , F, as the 
arguments of such a formula; in particular instances, the binder may be empty, and the 
formula may also have no arguments. Such a formula is said to be rigid if its head, i.e. 
A, is either a const ant or a variable that appears in the binder, and flexible otherwise. A 
formula having the above structure is also a X-normal form if F, is not identical to x, 
and, further, each of the Fis also satisfy this constraint. In subsequent sections, we shall 
have use for the structure of X-normal forms of type o. To describe this, we first identify an 
atom as a X-normal form whose leftmost symbol that is not a bracket is either a variable 
or a parameter. Then, a X-normal form of type o is one of the following: (i) T, (ii) an 
atom, (iii) -F, where F is a X-normal form of type o, (iv) [F V GI, [F A GI, or [F > GI 
where F and G are X-normal forms of type o, or (v) C P or II P, where P is a X-normal 
form. 
Substitutions. A substitution is a set of the form {(xi, Pi) I 1 5 i 5 n), where, for 
1 5 i 5 n, each xi is a distinct variable and F; is a formula in principal normal form of 
the same type as, but distinct from, xi; this substitution is a substitution for {xl, . . . , x,), 
and its range is {Fl, . . . , F,). A substitution may be viewed as a type preserving mapping 
on variables that is the identity everywhere except the points explicitly specified. This 
mapping may be extended to the class of all formulas in a manner consistent with this 
view: If 8 = {(x;, F;) 1 1 5 i < n )  and G is any formula, then 
This definition is independent of the order in which we take the pairs from 8. Further, given 
our notion of equality between formulas, the application of a substitution to a formula G 
is evidently a formalization of the idea of replacing the free occurrences of X I , .  . . , xn in G 
simultaneously by the formulas Fl, . . . , F,. 
We need certain terminology pertaining to substitutions, and we summarize these here. 
A formula F is said to be an ins tance  of another formula G if it results from applying a 
substitution to G. The res t r ic t ion  of a substitution 8 to a set of variables V, denoted by 
8 T V,  is given as follows 
It is evident that O(G) = (8 T F(G))(G). The composi t ion  of two substitutions 81 and 
82, written as 61 o 02, is precisely the composition of O1 and 82 when these are viewed 
as mappings: o B2(G) = O1(O2(G)). TWO substitutions, 81 and O2 are said to be equal 
relative to a set of variables V if it is the case that 81 T V = 82 f V; this relationship is 
denoted by 81 =, 62. 81 is said to be less general t h a n  82 relative to V, a relationship 
denoted by 81 sv 02, if there is a substitution a such that 81 =, a o 82. Finally, we 
shall sometimes talk of the result of applying a substitution to sets of formulas and to 
sets of pairs of formulas. In the first case, we mean the set that results from applying the 
substitution to each formula in the set, and, in the latter case, we mean the set of pairs 
that results from the application of the substitution to each element in each pair. 
The Formal System. The notion of derivation used in this paper is formalized by 
means of the sequent calculus LKH that is a higher-order extension to the logistic classical 
calculus LK of 191. A sequent  within the calculus LK H is an expression of the form 
where n  2 0, m > 0, and, for 1 5 i 5 n  and 1 5 j 5 m, Fi and G j  are formulas; the 
listing F l , . .  . , Fn is the antecedent  of the sequent, and GI , .  . . ,G, forms its succedent.  
The in i t ia l  sequents  or ax ioms  of the calculus are 4 T and the sequents of the form 
A -+ A' where A and A' are atomic formulas such that A G A'. The in ference  figures 
are the arrangements of sequents that result from the schemata in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
by replacing (i) the r s  and As by finite sequences of formulas of type o, (ii) A and B 
by formulas of type o, (iii) A', in the schemata designated by A, by a formula resulting 
by a sequence of A-conversions from the formula that replaces A in the lower sequent of 
the schema, and, finally, (iv) P, C, and y in the schemata designated by C-IS, II-IS, 
C-IA, and 11-IA by, respectively, a formula of type a -+ o, a formula of type a,  and a 
parameter or variable of type a that does not occur free in any formulas substituted into 
the lower sequent, for some choice of a. An inference figure is classified as a s t ruc tural  or 
an operational one, depending on whether it results from a schema in Figure 2.1 or 2.2. In 
the operational inference figures, we designate the formula substituted for the expression 
containing the logical constant as the principal formula of the figure. Some operational 
inference figures contain two upper sequents, and these are referred to, respectively, as the 
left  and right  upper sequents of the figure. 
Th inn ing :  in the  antecedent  
r + A  
in t h e  succedent  
r -+ A 
Contrac t ion:  in the  antecedent  in t h e  succedent  
Interchange: in the  antecedent  in t h e  succedent  
in t h e  antecedent  
A1,r -+ A 
in t h e  succedent  
I? + A7A1 
Figure 2.1: The LKH Structural Inference Figure Schemata 
Intrinsic to a sequent calculus is the notion of a der iva t ion  or proof figure. These 
are tree-like arrangements of sequents that combine to form inference figures such that 
(i) each sequent, with the exception of one called the endsequent ,  is the upper sequent of 
exactly one inference figure, (ii) each sequent is the lower sequent of at most one inference 
figure and those sequents that are not the lower sequents of any inference figure are initial 
sequents. Such an arrangement constitutes a derivation for  its endsequent. If there is a 
A , r  * A B , r  --4 A V-IA 
A , r  t A B , r  --+ A 
A-IA A-IA 
A A B , F  t A AAB,I '  t A 
P ( [ P Y ] ) ~ ~  --+ A C-IA 
~ ( [ p C l ) , r  + A II-IA 
Figure 2.2: The LKH Operational Inference Figure Schemata 
derivation for --, A, where A is a formula, then A is said to be provable from r. A path 
in a derivation is a sequence of sequents whose first member is the endsequent and whose 
last member is an initial sequent, and of which every member except the first is the upper 
sequent of an inference figure whose lower sequent is the preceding member. The height of 
the proof figure is the length of the longest path in the figure. Each sequent occurrencet in 
a derivation is on a unique path, and we refer to the number of sequents that precede it on 
this path as its distance from the endsequent. The notion of a derivation is relativized to 
particular sequent calculi by the choice of initial sequents and inference figures, and we use 
this observation in Section 4. Our current focus is on the calculus LKH, and we intend 
unqualified uses of the term "derivation" below to be read as LKH-derivation. 
It is of interest to note that if q-conversion is added as a rule of inference to the 
system 7 of [I], then the resulting system is equivalent to the calculus LKH in the sense 
described in [9]. Specifically, let us say that the associated formula of the sequent I' + A 
is AT > VA if neither the antecedent nor the succedent is empty, VA if only the antecedent 
is empty, AT > p A ~p if only the succedent is empty, and p A ~p if the antecedent and the 
succedent are both empty; p is a designated propositional variable here, and [ A r ]  and [VA] 
are to be read as conjunctions and disjunctions of the formulas in I? and A respectively. It 
is then the case that a derivation exists for I' + A if and only if its associated formula 
is a theorem of 7 with the rule of 7-conversion; we assume here that the symbols A, > 
and C are introduced via abbreviations in 7. 
The reader familiar with [9] may notice several similarities between the calculi LK 
and LKH. One difference between these is the absence of the C u t  inference figure in 
LKH. This omission is justified by the cut-elimination result for the version of higher- 
order logic under consideration [I]. Another, apparently superficial, difference is in the 
use in LKH of A-conversion to capture the notion of substitution in inference figures 
pertaining to quantifiers. The only significant difference, then is in the richer syntax of 
formulas and the presence of the A inference figures in LKH. We note in particular that 
the presence of predicate variables in formulas of L K H enables substitutions to change 
their logical structure. As a result, it is possible to describe several complex derivations in 
a concise form in this higher-order logic. However, this facet makes the task of constructing 
satisfactory proof procedures for this logic a difficult one. In fact, as we shall see shortly, 
considerable care must be taken even in enunciating and verifying the proof-theoretic 
properties of our higher-order formulas. 
3. Higher-Order Definite Sentences and Goal Formulas 
Using the higher-order logic of the previous section, the desired generalizations to first- 
order definite sentences and goal formulas may be identified. Intrinsic to this identification 
is the notion of a positive formula. As made precise by the following definition, these are 
the formulas in which the symbols N, > and II do not appear. 
t The qualification "occurrence" will henceforth be assumed implicitly where necessary. 
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3.1. Definition. The class of positive formulas, PF, is the smallest collection of formulas 
such that (i) each variable and each constant other than -, > and ll is in PF, and (ii) the 
formulas Ax.A and [ A  B] are in PF if A and B are in P F .  The Positive Herbrand Universe, 
'H+, is the collection of all A-normal formulas in P F ,  and the Herbrand Base, 'FID, is the 
collection of all closed formulas in 'H+. 
As will become apparent shortly, 'FID in our context plays the same role as the Herbrand 
Universe does in the context of other discussions of logic programming: it is the domain 
of terms that is used in describing the results of computations. 
3.2. Definition. A higher-order goal formula is a formula of type o in I f + .  A positive 
atom is an atomic goal formula, i. e. an atom in 'H+. A higher-order definite formula is 
any formula of the form Vz.G > A where G is a goal formula, A is a rigid positive atom; 
in particular, 2 may be an empty sequence, i.e. the quantification may be absent. Such a 
formula is a higher-order definite sentence if it is closed, i.e. if 2 contains all the variables 
free in G and A. The qualification "higher-order" used in this definition is intended to 
distinguish the formulas defined from the first-order formulas of the same name and may 
be omitted if, by so doing, no confusion should arise. 
A formula is a positive atom if it is either T or of the form [A Fl . . . F,] where A is a 
parameter or a variable and, for 1 5 i 5 n, Fi is a positive formula, and is a rigid positive 
atom if, in the latter case, A is also a parameter. It is easily verified that a goal formula 
must be one of the following: (i) a positive atom, (ii) A V B or A A B, where A and B are 
goal formulas, or (iii) C P where P is a predicate in 'H+; in the last case, we observe that 
it is equivalent to a formula of the form 3x.G where G is a goal formula. Thus, we see that 
the top-level logical structure of definite sentences and goal formulas in the higher-order 
setting is quite similar to those in the first-order context. The first-order formulas are, 
in fact, contained in the corresponding higher-order formulas under an implicit encoding 
that essentially assigns types to the first-order terms and predicates. To be precise, if i is 
a sort other that o, the encoding assigns the type i to variables and constants, the type 
i -+ . - . + i -+ i, with n + 1 occurrences of i, to each n-ary function symbol, and the 
type i + . . . -+ i + o, with n occurrences of i, to each n-ary predicate symbol. Looked at 
differently, our formulas contain within them a many-sorted version of first-order definite 
sentences and goal formulas. However, they do embody a genuine generalization to the 
first-order formulas in that they may contain complex terms that are constructed by the 
use of abstractions and applications and, further, may also include quantifications over 
variables that correspond to functions and predicates. The following examples serve to 
illustrate these additional facets. 
3.3. Example. Let list be a 1-ary type constructor and let int be a sort. Further, let 
nil and cons be parameters of type (list int) and int + (list int) + (list int) respectively, 
and let mapfun be a parameter of type (int + int) + (list int) + (list int) + o. Then 
the two formulas below are definite sentences: 
V f .  [T > [map f un f nil nil]], 
Vf .Vx.Vll .Vl2.[[map f un f 11 121 > [map f un f [cons x 11] [cons [f x] 12]]]; 
f is evidently a function variable in these formulas. If 1, 2, and and g are parameters of 
type int, int, and int + int --+ int respectively, the following is a goal formula: 
3l.[map f un [Xx.[g x 111 [cons 1 [cons 2 nil]] 11. 
Observe that this formula contains the higher-order term Xx.[g x 11. 
3.4. Example. Let primrel be a parameter of type (i + i + o) + o and let rel, 
wife, mother, jane, and mary be parameters of appropriate types. The following are 
then definite sentences: 
[T > [mother jane mary]], [T > [wi f ejohnjane]], 
[T > [primrel mother]], [T > [primrel wi f el], Vr.[[primrel r] > [re1 r]], 
Vr.Vs.[[[primrel r] A [primrel s]] 3 [re1 [Xx.Xy.qz.[[r x z] A [s z y]]]]]. 
Observe that the last definite sentence contains the predicate variables r and s.  Further, 
the complex term that appears as the argument of the predicate re1 in this definite sentence 
contains an existential quantifier and a conjunction. The formula 
+.[[re1 r] A [r john mary]] 
is a goal formula in this context. It is a goal formula in which a predicate variable occurs 
"extensionally", i. e. in a position where a substitution made for it can affect the top-level 
logical structure of the formula. 
In the next section, we examine some of the properties of higher-order definite sen- 
tences and goal formulas. To preview the main results there, we introduce the following 
definition. 
3.5. Definition. A substitution 9 is a positive substitution if its range is contained in 
7f+. It is a closed positive substitution if its range is contained in W .  
Now let P be a finite collection of definite sentences, and let G be a goal formula whose 
free variables are contained in the listing x. We shall see, then, that 3z.G is provable from 
P just in case there is a closed positive substitution v for x such that 9(G) is provable 
from P. This observation shall also facilitate the description of a simple proof procedure 
that may be used to extract substitutions such as v .  From these observations it will follow 
that our definite sentences and goal formulas provide the basis for a generalization to the 
programming paradigm of first-order logic. 
4. Properties of Higher-Order Definite Sentences 
As observed in Section 3, one difference between the top-level logical structure of 
first-order and higher-order goal formulas is that, in the higher-order context, predicate 
variables may appear as the heads of atomic goals. A consequence of this difference is that 
some of the proofs that can be constructed for goal formulas from definite sentences in the 
higher-order setting have quite a different character from any in the first-order case. An 
illustration of this fact is provided by the following derivation of the goal formula 3y.[P y]  
from the definite sentence Vx. [ x  > [P A]].  
[PBI + [PBI C-IS 
[PBI + 3Y-[PYl 
--IS [PA1 + [PA1 C-IS 
+ 3 y . p  Y ] ,  -[P Bl [ P A ]  + 3Y.[PYI > -1A 
- [PB]  3 [ P A ]  3Y.[PYI, 3Y.[PYI Contraction 
- [ p  Bl 3 [ P A ]  + ~ Y - [ P Y I  I -IA 
Vx.[x > [ P A ] ]  -+ 3y.[P y]  
It is easily observed that the top-level logical structure of a first-order formula remains 
invariant under any substitutions that are made for its free variables. It may then be 
seen that in a derivation whose endsequent contains only first-order definite formulas in 
the antecedent and only first-order goal formulas in the succedent, every other sequent 
must have only definite formulas and atoms in the antecedent and goal formulas in the 
succedent. This is, however, not the case in the higher-order context, as illustrated by the 
above derivation. Consider, for instance, the penultimate sequent in this derivation that 
is reproduced below: 
- [PB]  > [ P A ]  + 3y.[Py]. (*> 
The formula -[P B ]  > [P A] that appears in the antecedent of this sequent is neither a 
definite formula nor an atom. Looking closely at this sequent also reveals why this might 
be a cause for concern from the perspective of our current endeavor. Although this sequent 
has a derivation, we observe that there is no term t such that 
-[P B] > [ P A ]  --+ [ P t ]  
has a derivation. Now, if all derivations of 
Vx . [x > [P A]] 
involve the derivation of (*), or of sequents similar to (*) in the sense just outlined, then 
there would be no proof of 3y.[P y] from 3x. [x > [P A]] from which an "answer" may be ex- 
tracted. Thus, it would be the case that one of the properties critical to the computational 
interpret ation of definite sentences is false. 
We show in this section that problems of the sort alluded to in the previous paragraph 
do not arise, and that, in fact, higher-order definite sentences and goal formulas resemble 
the corresponding first-order formulas in several proof-theoretic senses. The method that 
we adopt in demonstrating this may be described as follows. Let us identify the following 
inference figure schemata 
where we expect only closed positive formulas, 2.e. formulas from 'HZ?, to be substituted 
for C. These are evidently subcases of 11-IA and C-IS. We shall show that if there is 
any derivation at all of a sequent I? + A where consists only of definite sentences and 
A consists only of closed goal formulas, then there is one in which every inference figure 
obtained from 11-IA or C-IS is also an instance of II-IA' and C-IS' respectively. These 
schemata are of interest because in any of their instances, if the lower sequent has only 
closed positive atoms and definite sentences in the antecedent and closed goal formulas 
in the succedent then so too does the upper sequent. Derivations of the sort mentioned, 
therefore, bear structural similarities to those in the first-order case, a fact that may be 
exploited to show that higher-order definite sentences and goal formulas retain many of 
the computational properties of their first-order counterparts. 
The result that we prove below is actually of interest quite apart from the purposes of 
this paper. The so-called cut-elimination theorems have been of interest in the context of 
logic because they provide an insight into the nature of deduction and often are the basis for 
its mechanization. In the context of first-order logic, for instance, this theorem leads to the 
subformula property: if a sequent has a derivation, then it has one in which every formula 
in any intermediate sequent is a subformula of some formula in the endsequent. Several 
other useful structural properties of deduction in the first-order context flow from this 
observation, and the traditional proof procedures for first-order logic are based on it. As 
is evident from the example at the beginning of this section, the subformula property does 
not hold (under any acceptable interpretation) for higher-order logic even though the logic 
admits a cut-elimination theorem; predicate terms containing connectives and quantifiers 
may be generalized upon in the course of a derivation, and thus intermediate sequents 
may have formulas whose structure cannot be predicted from the formulas in the final 
one. For this reason, the usefulness of cut-elimination as a mechanism for analyzing and 
automating deduction in higher-order logic has been generally doubted. However, Theorem 
4.1 below shows that there is useful structural information about proofs in higher-order 
logic to be obtained from the cut-elimination theorem for this logic, and is one of few 
results of this sort. This theorem permits us to observe that in the restricted setting of 
higher-order Horn clauses proofs for every derivable sequent can be constructed without 
ever having to generalize on predicate terms containing the logical constants N, >, and 
I I .  This observation in turn provides information about the structure of each sequent in 
a derivation and constitutes a restriction on substitution terms that is suffcient to enable 
the description of a complete theorem proving procedure for higher-order Horn clauses. 
A Simplified Sequent Calculus. Part of the discussion above is given a precise form 
by the following theorem: 
4.1. Theorem. Let I? be a sequence of formulas that are either definite sentences or 
closed positive atoms of type o, and let A be a sequence of closed goal formulas. Then 
I' + A has an LKH-derivation only if it has one in which 
(i) the only inference figures that appear are Contraction, Interchange, Thinning, V-IS, 
A-IS, C-IS, > -1A and 11-IA, and 
(ii) each occurrence of the figure 11-IA or C-IS is also an occurrence of the figure II-IA' 
or C-IS'. 
The proof of this theorem is obtained by describing a transformation from an arbitrary 
LKH-derivation of I' + A into a derivation of the requisite kind. This transformation is 
performed by replacing the formulas in each sequent by what we might call their "positive 
correlates" and by removing certain parts of the derivation that become unnecessary as a 
result. The following definition describes the manner in which the formulas in the succedent 
of each sequent are transformed. 
4.2. Definition. Let x, y E Var, and, for each a,  let z, E Var(,,,). The function pos 
on formulas is then defined as follows: 
(i) If F is a constant or a variable 
I Ax.Ay.T, if F is 3; pos(F) = Az,.T, if F is IT of type ((a  + o) + 0); 
I F, otherwise. 
(ii) pos([Fl F2] )  = [pos(F~) pos(F2)I. 
(iii) pos( Ax .F) = Ax.pos(F). 
Further, pc is the mapping on formulas defined as follows: If F is a formula, pc(F) = 
P(Pos(F)). 
From the definition above it follows easily that F(pc(F)) 2 F(pos(F)) = F ( F ) .  Thus 
if F is a closed formula, then pc(F) E 'HB. The properties of pc stated in the following 
lemma are similarly easily argued for; these properties will be used in the proof of the main 
theorem. 
4.3. Lemma. Let F be a A-normal formula of type o. 
(i) If F is an atom, then pc(F) is a positive atom. 
(ii) I f F  is -Fl, Fl > F 2 ,  or I P, then pc(F) = T.  
(iii) If F is G * H where * is either V or A, then pc(F) = pc(G) * pc(H). 
(iv) If F is C P, then pc(F) = Cpc(P) 
In the lemma below, we argue that pc and p commute as operations on formulas. This 
observation is of interest because it yields the property of pc that is stated in Corollary 
4.5 and is needed in the proof of the Theorem 4.1. 
4.4. Lemma. For any formula F, pc(p(F)) = p(pc(F)). 
Proof. Given any formula B of the same type as x, an easy induction on the structure 
of a formula G verifies the following facts: If B is free for x in G, then pos(B) is free for 
x in pos(G) and pos(Sfj G) = S;o,(B)pos(G). Now, let us say that a formula H results 
directly from a formula G by an application of a rule of A-conversion if the subformula of G 
that is replaced by virtue of one of these rules is G itself. We claim that if H does indeed 
result from G in such a manner, then pos(H) also results from pos(G) in a similar manner. 
This claim is easily proved from the following observations: 
(i) If G is Ax.G1 and H is Ay.Si GI,  pos(G) is Xx.pos(G1) and pos(H) is Ay.S;pos(G1). 
Further if y is free for x in G1 then y is free for x in pos(G1). 
(ii) If G is [Ax .GI] Ga and H is Sc2 G1 then pos(F) is [[Ax.pos(G1)] pos(G2)] and pos(H) 
is ';os(G~) pos(G1). Further if G2 is free for x in G1 then pos(G2) is free for x in 
pos(G1). 
(iii) If G is of type a -+ P then pos(G) is also of type a + P. If G is Ay.[H y] then pos(G) 
is Ay.[pos(H) y] and, further, y E F(pos(H)) only if y E .F(H). 
Now let F' result from F by a rule of A-conversion. By making use of the claim 
above and by inducing on the structure of F, it may be shown that pos(F') results from 
pos(F) by a similar rule. From this it follows that pos(p(F)) results from pos(F) by the 
application of the rules of A-conversion. Hence p(pos(p(F))) = p(pos(F)). Noting further 
that p(pos(F)) = p(p(pos(F))), the lemma is proved. I 
4.5. Corollary. If P and C are formulas of appropriate types, then 
PC(P([P Cl)) = P( bc(P) pc(C)I). 
Proof. The claim is evident from the following equalities: 
PC(P([PCI)) = P(Pc([PCI)) by Lemma 4.4 
= P( bos(P) P O S ( ~ ) ] )  using definitions 
= p([p(pos(P)) p(pos(C))]) by properties of A-conversion 
= P( bc(p) PC(C)] using definitions. I 
While the mapping pc will adequately serve the purpose of transforming formulas in 
the succedent of each sequent in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it does not suffice as a means 
for transforming formulas in the antecedent. It may be observed that if F is a definite 
formula then pc(F) = T. The transformation to be effected on formulas in the antecedent 
must be such that it preserves definite formulas. In order to describe such a mapping, 
we find it useful first to identify the following class of formulas that contains the class of 
definite formulas. 
4.6. Definition. A formula of type o is an implicational formula just in case it has one 
of the following forms 
(i) F > A, where F and A are A-normal formulas and in addition A is a rigid atom, or 
(ii) Vx.F, where F is itself an implicational formula. 
We now define a function on implicational formulas whose purpose is to transform 
these formulas into definite formulas. 
4.7. Definition. The function posi on implicational formulas is defined as follows 
(i) If F is H > A then posi(F) = pos(H) > pos(A). 
(ii) If F is Vx.F1 then posi(F) = Vx.posi(F1) 
If F is an implicational formula then pci(F) = p(posi(F)). 
From the definition, it is evident that if F is a definite formula, posi(F) = F and, 
hence, pci(F) = p(F). While this is not true when F is an arbitrary implicational formula, 
it is clear that pci(F) is indeed a definite formula. The following lemma states an additional 
property of pc; that will be useful in the proof of Theorem 4.1. 
4.8. Lemma. IfFisanimplicationalformulaandx andCare,respectively, avariable 
and a formula of the same type, then 
~c i (~ ( [Ax-F l  C)) = p([Ax.pci(F)l PC(C)). 
Proof. An easy induction on the structure of F shows that p([Ax.F] C) is an implica- 
tional formula. Hence posi is defined on this formula and, consequently, the left-hand side 
of the equality is defined. We now claim that 
pos;(p([Ax .F] C)) A-conv [Ax.pos;(F)] pos(C). 
Given this claim, it is clear that 
~(~osi(p([Ax-F] C))) = p([Ax.~osi(F)] ~ o s ( C ) ,  
and the lemma follows by observing that p([Ax.A] B) = p([Xx.p(A)] p(B)). 
Thus, it only remains to show the claim. Given any implicational formula Fl, we 
observe that if Fl E F2 then posi(Fl) E posi(F2). In trying to show the claim, we may 
therefore assume that the bound variables of F are distinct from x and from the free 
variables of C. Making such an assumption, we now induce on the structure of F :  
(a) F is of the form H > A. In this case p([Ax.F] C) E p(S8 H) > p(SE A). Using the 
definition of posi and arguments similar to those in Lemma 4.4, we see that 
posi(p(Si,H)>p(SZ.A)) A-con~ S ~ 0 3 ( c ) ~ 0 s ( H ) 3 S ~ O ~ ( ~ ) ~ 0 s ( A )  
The claim easily follows from these observations. 
(b) F is of the form Vy.F1. Since the bound variables of F are distinct from x and the free 
variables of C, we see that 
p([Xx.F] C) E Vy.p([Ax.F1] C). 
Using the inductive hypothesis and the definitions of A-conversion and of posi we see 
that 
pos; AX . F] C)) A-conv Vy . [[Ax .posi (F1)] pos (C)] .
Observing that F(C)  = F(pos(C)), it is clear that 
Vy . [[Ax .posi(F1)] pos(C)] A-conv [Ax. ~y.pos;(F1)]] pos(C). 
The claim is now apparent from the definition of pos;. 1 
Using the two mappings pc and pc;, the desired transformation on sequent s may now 
be stated. This is the content of the following definition. 
4.9. Definition. First, we extend pci to the class of all formulas of type o: 
(F )  = { P C ; ( ~ ) ,  if F is an implicational formula; 
pc(F), otherwise. 
The mapping pc, on sequents is then defined as follows: pc,(I' 4 A) is the sequent that 
results by replacing each formula F in F by pco(F) and each formula G in A by pc(G). 
We are now in a position to describe, in a precise manner, the transformation of 
LKH-derivations alluded to immediately after the statement of Theorem 4.1. We do this 
below, thereby proving the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1 We assume initially that every formula in I? and A is in principal 
normal form; we indicate how this requirement may be relaxed at the end. Now, a simple 
inductive argument on the heights of derivations convinces us of the following fact: If O' 
and A' are finite sequences of formulas that are obtained from O and A, respectively, by 
replacing each formula by one of its A-normal forms, then O + A has a derivation only 
if O' + A' has a derivation in which the inference figure A does not appear. Since every 
formula in I? and A is in A-normal form, we may assume that r + A has a derivation 
in which no use is made of the inference figure A. Further, since every formula in r and 
A is closed, we may assume that each instance of the schemata IT-IA and C-IS in this 
derivation is obtained by substituting a closed formula for C; if a variable y does appear 
free in the formula substituted for C, then we replace each free occurrence of y in it and in 
the sequents in the derivation by a parameter of the same type as y that does not already 
appear in the derivation; it is easy to see that the result is still a derivation of the same 
kind, and that its endsequent is still r + A. Let T be such a derivation. We show below 
that T can be transformed into a derivation satisfying the requirements of the theorem. 
To define the transformation, we need to distinguish between what we call the essential 
and the inessential sequents in T. A sequent (occurrence) is considered inessential if it 
appears above the lower sequent of a ll-IS, > -IS or --IS inference figure along any 
path in the derivation. A sequent is essential if it is not inessential. We claim that every 
formula in the antecedent of an essential sequent is either a rigid atom or an impl.icationa1 
formula. Observe that from this claim it also follows that each essential sequent, except the 
endsequent, is the upper sequent of one of the figures Contraction, Interchange, Thinning, 
V-IS, A-IS, C-IS, > -1A or 11-IA. 
The claim is proved by inducing on the distance of an essential sequent from the 
endsequent. If this distance is 0, the claim is obviously true. Assuming then that the 
claim is true if the distance is d, we verify it for distance d + 1. Given the inductive 
hypothesis, we only need to consider the cases when the sequent in question is the upper 
sequent of an inference figure in which there is a formula in the antecedent of an upper 
sequent that is not in the antecedent of the lower sequent, i. e. one of the figures --IS, 
V-IA, A-IA, 1 -IA, 3 -IS, ll-IA, and C-IA. The cases of --IS and > -IS are ruled 
out, given that we are considering essential sequents. Also, since the antecedent of the 
lower sequent contains only implicational formulas and rigid atoms, the figure in question 
cannot be one of V-IA, A-IA, or C-IA. The only cases that remain are > -1A and 
IT-IA. In the first case, i. e. when the inference figure in question is 
the principal formula must be an implicational formula, and G must therefore be a rigid 
atom. From this it is clear that the claim holds in this case. If the inference figure is 
ll-IA, i.e. of the form 
p(PC),O + A 
l lP ,O  + A 
the principal formula must again be an implicational formula, and so P must be of the 
form Xx.F where F is an implicational formula. But then it is easily seen that p(P C) 
must be an implicational formula and the claim is verified. 
Now let e(T) be the structure that results from removing all the inessential sequents 
from T; e(T) is a derivation of I? -+ A but for the fact that some of its leaf sequents are 
not axioms: Such sequents are of the form E + a, P ,  where P is -F, I1 B or F > G. 
Let pe(T) be the result of replacing each O + A in e(T) by PC,(@ + A). We claim 
that each pair of upper sequent(s) and lower sequent in pe(T) is an instance of the same 
inference figure schema as the corresponding pair in e(T). To show this, we consider each 
of the possible cases in e(T) and check the corresponding pairs in pe(T). The claim is 
easily verified if the pair is an instance of Contraction, Interchange or Thinning. The cases 
for V-IS and A-IS are similarly clear, given Lemma 4.3. If the pair is an instance of 
> -IA, the principal formula is an implicational formula of the form F > A. Observing 
then that pci (F > A) = pc(F) > pc(A), the claim follows in this case as well. If the pair 
from e(T) is an instance of C-IS, i. e. of the form 
the claim follows from Lemma 4.3 and Corollary 4.5; pc(C P) = Cpc(P) and 
P ~ ( P ( P  C)) = P(PC(P) P~(C) ) .  
We note further that, since C is a closed formula, pc(C) E 'Ha and so the corresponding 
figure in pe(T) is actually an instance of C-IS'. Finally, let the pair in e(T) be an instance 
of IT-IA, i.e. of the form 
p(PC),O + A 
rIP,O 4 A 
By our earlier observations I2 P is an implicational formula, and hence P is of the form 
Xx.F, where F is an implicational formula. Using Lemma 4.8, we see that 
Noting now that pci(II [Xx.F]) G [11 [Xx.pci(F)]] and that pc(C) E 'HB, it is clear that the 
corresponding pair in pe(T)  is also an instance of 11-IA, and in fact of 11-IA' . 
Given the forms of formulas in I? and A,  we observe that pc,(I? -+ A )  = I' -+ A. 
We also note that if A is an atomic formula and A F A', then pc,(A) = pc(A1). Thus 
we may conclude, from the above considerations and Lemma 4.3, that pe(T)  would be a 
derivation of r + A of the sort required by the theorem but for the fact that some of 
its leaf sequent s are of the form O + A, T. However, we may adjoin derivations of the 
form 
- sequence of Thinnings 
and Interchanges 
O + A , T  
above sequents of this sort to obtain a genuine LKH-derivation that satisfies the theorem. 
The above argument is adequate in the case that each formula in I? and A is in 
principal normal form. If this is not the case, then we proceed as follows. First we 
construct a derivation of the requisite sort for I?' t A', where I?' and A' are obtained 
from I' and A respectively by placing each formula in principal normal form. A simple 
inductive argument then suffices to show that this derivation may be converted into one 
for I? + A by replacing some of the formulas in the derivation by formulas that they 
convert to via the rule of a-conversion. 
4.10. Example. An illustration of the transformation described in the proof of Theorem 
4.1 may be provided by considering the derivation presented at the beginning of this 
section. This would be transformed into the following: 
- Thinning 
+ T, 3 Y . P  YI Interchange [PA1 + [PA1 C-IS 
T 3 [PA1 + ~Y.[PYI, 3Y.[PYI Contraction 
T > [ P A ]  --+ 3y.[Py] 
11-IA 
VX.[X > [PA]]  -+ 3y.[Py] 
The content of Theorem 4.1 may be expressed by the description of a simplified 
sequent calculus for definite sentences and goal formulas. Let LKH D be the subcalculus 
of LKH with exactly the same initial sequents but with inference figures restricted to 
being instances of the schemata Contraction, Interchange, Thinning, V -IS, A-IS, C-IS' , 
> -IA, and II-IA'. In the discussions below we shall be concerned with derivations for 
sequents of the form I? d A, where r is any finite sequence of definite sentences and 
closed positive atoms and A is a finite sequence of closed goal formulas. By virtue of 
Theorem 4.1 we see that such a sequent has an LKH-derivation exactly when it has an 
LKHD-derivation. In considering questions about derivations for such a sequent we may, 
therefore, restrict our attention to the calculus LKHD, and we implicitly do so below. 
Proofs from Higher-Order Definite Sentences. We now use the preceding results 
to demonstrate that higher-order definite sentences and goal formulas retain the proof- 
theoretic properties of the corresponding first-order formulas that were discussed in Section 
1. In this endeavor, we use the characteristics of the higher-order formulas observed in the 
two lemmas below. The first lemma subsumes the statement that a finite set of higher-order 
definite sentences is consistent. 
4.11. Lemma. If I? is a finite sequence of definite sentences and closed positive atoms, 
then there can be no derivation for r -+ . 
Proof. Suppose the claim is false. Then there is a least h and a I? of the requisite sort 
such that I? + has a derivation of height h. Since I' -+ is not an initial sequent, h is 
evidently not 1. Consider now by cases the inference figures of which I? + could be the 
lower sequent, i. e. the figures Contraction, Thinning and Interchange in the antecedent, 
II-IA', and > -1A. In each of these cases it is easily observed that there must be a 
finite sequence of definite sentences and closed positive atoms I" such that I?' d has a 
derivation of height < h. This contradicts the leastness of h. I 
The lemma below relates the notions of classical and intuitionistic provability of a 
goal formula from a set of definite sentences. 
4.12. Lemma. Let I? be a finite sequence of definite sentences and closed positive atoms 
and let G be a closed god formula. Then I? ---+ G has a derivation only if it has one in 
which there is at most one formula in the succedent of each sequent. 
Proof. We claim that a slightly stronger statement is true: A sequent of the form 
I' -+ GI, .  . . , G,, where I? consists only of definite sentences and closed positive atoms 
and GI, . . . , G, are closed goal formulas, has a derivation only if there is an i such that 
1 5 i 5 n and I? + Gi has a derivation in which at most one formula appears in the 
succedent of each sequent. 
The claim is proved by an induction on the heights of derivations for sequents of the 
sort hypothesized in it. If the height is 1, then n = 1 and the claim is obviously true. Let 
us, therefore, assume the height is h + 1 and consider the possible cases for the inference 
figure that appears at the end of the derivation. If this figure is a Contraction, Thinning 
or Interchange in the succedent , the claim follows directly from the inductive hypothesis; 
in the case of Thinning, we only need to observe that, by Lemma 4.11, n > 1. The cases 
of Contraction, Thinning, and Interchange in the antecedent, V-IS, A-IS, C-IS' and 
II-IA', also follow from the hypothesis with a little further argument. Consider, for 
instance the case when the figure is an A-IS. The derivation at the end then has the 
following form: 
r --+ GI, .  . . , Gn-1, Gt, A G2, 
By the hypothesis, there must be a derivation of the requisite sort either for I' + Gi 
for some i, 15 i 5 n - 1, or for both + G; and r --+ G;. In the former case the 
claim follows directly, and in the latter case we use the two derivations together with an 
A-IS inference figure to construct a derivation of the requisite sort for I? + Gk A G;. 
The only remaining case is that of > -IA, i.e. when the inference figure in question is 
of the form 
rl + GI, ..., Gk,G A,r2 + Gk+l , . . - ,Gn 
From Lemma 4.11 it follows that k < n. By the hypothesis, we see that there is a derivation 
of the requisite sort either for rl + Gi for some i between 1 and k or for rl + G. 
In the former case, by adjoining a sequence of Thinning and Interchange figures below the 
derivation for rl + Gi we obtain the required derivation for G > A, rl, rz -+ Gi. 
In the latter case, using the induction hypothesis again we see that there is a derivation 
of the required sort for A , r 2  + Gj for some j between k + 1 and n. This deriva- 
tion may be combined with the one for ---, G to obtain the required derivation for 
G > A , r 1 7 r 2  
--+ Gj. ( 
Lemmas 4.11 and 4.12 permit us to further restrict our sequent calculus in the context 
of definite sentences. To make the picture precise, let us assume that r is a finite sequence 
of definite sentences and closed positive atoms, and that G is a goal formula such that 
r + G has a derivation. Then, using Lemma 4.12 we see that this sequent has a deriva- 
tion in which there is no occurrence of Contraction or Interchange in the succedent . Using 
Lemma 4.11 it may be seen that such a derivation is also one in which the figure Thinning 
in the succedent does not appear. Thus, in considering questions about derivability for 
sequents of the sort described above, we may dispense with the structural inference figures 
pertaining to the succedent. This fact is made use of in the proof of Theorem 4.14 and 
in the discussions that follow it. We present this theorem after introducing a convenient 
notational convention. 
4.13. Definition. Let D be the definite sentence VZ.G > A. Then (Dl denotes the set 
of all closed positive instances of G > A, i.e. 
ID( = {p(G > A) I cp is a closed positive substitution for 2). 
This notation is extended to sets of definite sentences: If P is such a set, 
lPl = U W I  I D E PI. 
From this definition it readily follows that ID1 and J P (  are both collections of definite 
sentences. 
4.14. Theorem. Let I' be a finite sequence of definite sentences and closed positive 
atoms, and let G be a closed goal formula. Then there is a derivation for r + G if and 
only if 
(i) G is G1 A G2 and there are derivations for r + G1 and I' - G2, or 
(ii) G is G1 V G2 and there is a derivation for either I? -+ GI or - G2, or 
(iii) G is C P and there is a C E If.23 such that - p(P C )  has a derivation, or 
(iv) G is an atom and either G is T, or G r A for some A in I?, or, for some definite 
sentence D in r, G' > A E IDI, G A, and there is a derivation for r --+ G'. 
Proof. (3) As we have noted, there is a derivation for a sequent of the sort described 
in the Theorem only if there is one in which there are no structural figures pertaining to 
the succedent. An induction on the heights of such derivations now proves the theorem in 
this direction. 
If I? + G has a derivation of height 1, then G is T or I? is A and G z A. In either 
case the theorem is true. For the case when the height is h + 1, we consider each possibility 
for the last inference figure in the derivation. If it is one of A-IS, V-IS or C-IS', the 
theorem is evidently true. If it is a Contraction in the antecedent, i.e. of the form 
F, F, r + G 
F,r - G 
we see that the upper sequent is of the kind described in the theorem and, in fact, has a 
derivation of height h. A recourse to the induction hypothesis now completes the proof. 
For instance, assume that G is of the form GI V G2. By the hypothesis, there is a derivation 
for F, F, r 4 Gi for i = 1 or i = 2. By adjoining below this derivation a Contraction in 
the antecedent, we obtain a derivation for F, l? - Gi. The analysis for the cases when 
G has a different structure follows an analogous pattern. 
In the cases when the last inference figure is a Thinn ing  or an Interchange in the 
antecedent, the argument is similar to that of Contraction. If the figure is II-IA', i.e. of 
the form 
we see that p(P C) and 11 P are both definite sentences and, further, that Ip(P C)I C J l I  PI. 
Applying the induction hypothesis to the upper sequent, the proof may now be completed 
by arguments similar to those outlined in the case of Contraction in the antecedent. 
The only remaining case is that of > -1A. In this case, by Lemma 4.11 we observe 
that the derivation at the end has the following form 
The right upper sequent of this inference figure is evidently of the form required for 
the induction hypothesis. Once again using arguments similar to those in the case of 
Contraction in the antecedent, the proof may be completed in all cases except when 
G - A. But if G - A, we observe that the theorem is still true, since a derivation 
for G' > A, r l ,  r2 + G' may be constructed by adjoining a sequence of Thinning and 
Interchange inference figures below the derivation for rl + GI. 
(c) The only case that needs explicit consideration here is that when, for some definite 
sentence D in I?, there is a G' > A E ID1 such that G = A and r + G' has a derivation. 
In this case a derivation for ---+ G may be constructed as follows: 
G 1 > A , r  --+ G 
sequence of II-IA' 
D' I? - sequence of Interchanges 
and a Contraction 
In Section 1 we outlined the proof-theoretic properties of first-order definite sentences 
and goal formulas that play a pivotal role in their use as a basis for programming. Theorem 
4.14 demonstrates that our higher-order generalizations of these formulas retain these 
properties. Thus, if G is a higher-order goal formula whose free variables are included in 
the listing X I ,  . . . , x, and P is a finite set of higher-order definite sentences, we see from 
clause (iii) of Theorem 4.14 that 3x1.. . .3x,.G is provable from P just in case there is a 
closed positive substitution cp for X I ,  . . . , xn such that cp(G) is provable from P. Hence, 
sets of higher-order definite sentences and higher-order goal formulas may be construed, 
respectively, as programs and queries in a manner exactly analogous to the first-order 
case. Furthermore, clauses (i) - (iii) show that A, V and the existential quantifier provide 
primitives for search specification in exactly the same way as in the first-order setting. 
Finally, by virtue of (iv), higher-order definite sentences provide the basis for defining 
nondeterministic procedures. Notice that in a definite sentence of form Vz.(G > A), the 
head of A must be a parameter, and construing this formula as a procedure defining this 
head of A, therefore, makes good sense. 
Theorem 4.14 also provides the skeleton for a procedure that may be used for deter- 
mining whether a goal formula is provable from a set of definite sentences. In essence, 
clauses (i) - (iii) describe the means by which the search for a proof of a complex goal 
formula may be reduced to the search for proofs of a set of atoms. The search for a proof of 
an atomic goal may be progressed by "backchaining" on definite sentences in the manner 
indicated by clause (iv). A precise description of this proof procedure requires the expli- 
cation of the notion of higher-order unification, and we undertake this task in the next 
section. We note, however, that the steps mentioned above must simplify the search in 
some manner if they are to be effective in finding a proof. That they do have this effect 
may be seen by associating a measure, indexed by a finite set of definite sentences, with 
each goal formula. For this purpose, we identify the notion of a reduced path in a derivation 
as a sequence of sequents that results by the removal of the lower sequents of structural 
inference figures from a path in the derivation; intuitively, the length of a reduced path is 
a count of the number of operational inference figures that appear along the corresponding 
path. Letting the true height of a derivation be the length of the longest reduced path in 
the derivation, the required measure may be defined as follows. 
4.15. Definition. Let I' be a finite sequence of definite sentences, and let G be a closed 
goal formula. Further, let k be the least among the true heights of derivations for I' --+ G 
in which there appear no structural inference figures pertaining to the succedent; if no such 
derivation exists, k  = w .  Then 
if k < w ;  
" (G) = { $' otherwise. 
The measure is extended to be relative to a finite set, P, of definite sentences by defining 
pp(G) = pr(G) where I' is a listing of the members of P. This extension is clearly 
independent of the particular listing chosen. 
The properties of this measure that are of interest from the perspective of describing 
a proof procedure are stated in the following Lemma. 
4.16. Lemma. Let P be a finite set of definite sentences and let G be a closed goal 
formula that is provable from P.  Then pp(G) > 0 and pp(G) < w .  Further, 
(i) If G is an atom other than T then there is a G' > G E (PI such that pP(G') < pp(G). 
(ii) If G is GI V G2 then pp(G;) < pp(G) for i = 1 or i = 2. 
(iii) If G is G1 A G2 then pP(Gl)  + pP(G2) < pp(G). 
(iv) If G is C P  then for some C E 7-B it is the case that pp(p(P C)) < pp(CP) .  
Proof. pP(G) is obviously greater that 0. Since G is provable from P, it is also obvious 
that pp(G) < w . Now let r be a finite sequence of definite sentences such that I' + G 
has a derivation of true height h. A reexamination of the proof of Lemma 4.14 reveals 
the following facts: If G is GI V G2, then I' 4 Gi has a derivation of true height < h 
for i = 1 or i = 2. If G is GI A G2, then I' + Gi has a derivation of true height < h 
for i = 1 and i = 2. I f  G is C P ,  then there is a C E 71% such that r --+ p(PC) has a 
derivation of true height < h. If G is an atom, then there is a G' > G E (PI such that 
+ G' has a derivation of true height < h. From these observations, the rest of the 
lemma follows easily. 
5.  Searching for Proofs from Definite Sentences 
We now turn to the task of describing a procedure for determining whether there 
is a proof for the existential closure of a goal formula from a set of definite sentences. 
As already noted, the description of such a procedure requires a consideration of the 
problem of unifying two higher-order formulas. This problem has been studied by several 
researchers, and in most extensive detail by [15]. In the first part of this section, we 
summarize this problem and detail those aspects of its solution in [15] that are pertinent 
to our current endeavor. We then introduce the notion of a P-derivation. P-derivations 
are a generalization to the higher-order context of the notion of SLD-derivations described 
in [2] and prevalent in most discussions of first-order definite sentences. At one level, 
they are intended to be syntactic objects for demonstrating the existence of a proof for a 
goal formula and our discussions show their correctness from this perspective. At another 
level, they are intended to provide a basis for an actual proof procedure - a symbol 
manipulating procedure that searches for P-derivations would constitute an interpreter 
for a programming paradigm that is based on higher-order definite sentences - and we 
explore some of their properties that are pertinent to the description of such a procedure. 
The Higher-Order Unification Problem. Let us call a pair of formulas of the same 
type a disagreement  pair. A disagreement  s e t  is then a finite set, {(F;, Hi) 1 1 5 i < n), 
of disagreement pairs, and a uni f ier  for the set is a substitution a such that, for 1 < i 5 
n, a(Fi) = a(H,). The higher-order un i f ica t ion  problem is then the following: Given a 
disagreement set, we desire to determine whether it has unifiers, and to explicitly provide 
a unifier if it does have one. 
The problem described above is a generalization of the well-known unification problem 
for first-order terms. The higher-order unification problem has several properties that are, 
in a certain sense, divergent from those of the problem in the first-order case. For instance, 
the question of whether a unifier exists for an arbitrary disagreement set in the higher- 
order context is an undecidable question [lo, 14, 171, whereas the corresponding question 
for first-order terms is decidable. As another example, it has been shown [12] that most 
general unifiers do not always exist for unifiable higher-order disagreement pairs. Despite 
these characteristics of the problem, a systematic search can be made for unifiers of a given 
disagreement set, and we discuss this aspect below. 
Huet, in [15], describes a procedure for determining the existence of unifiers for a 
given disagreement set and shows that, whenever unifiers do exist, the procedure may 
be used to provide some of them. The basis for this procedure is in the fact that there 
are certain disagreement sets for which at least one unifier may easily be provided and, 
similarly, there are other disagreement sets for which it is easily manifest that no unifiers 
can exist. Given an arbitrary disagreement set, the procedure then attempts to reduce it 
to a disagreement set of one of these two kinds. This reduction proceeds by an iterative 
use of two kinds of simplifying functions, called SIMPL and MATCH, on disagreement 
sets. Since our notion of a P-derivation uses these functions in an intrinsic way, we devote 
some effort to describing them below. 
In presenting the functions SIMPL and MATCH and in analyzing their properties, 
the normal form for formulas that is introduced by the following definition is useful. 
- 
5.1. Definition. A @-normal form F = Axl.. . . Axn.[H Al . . . A,] is said to be a pq-long 
form if the type of H is of the form a1 + - .  . + a ,  + ao, where a. is an atomic type, 
and, for 1 5 i 5 m, Ai is also a pq-long form. If F is a formula such that F A-conv F, then 
F is said to be a pq-long fonn of F .  Given a ,@-long form F = Az.[H A1 . . . A,], a count 
of the number of occurrences of applications in F is provided by the following recursively 
defined measure on F :  
m 
It is clear that every formula has a pq-long form; such a form may be obtained by 
first converting the formula to a p-normal form, and then performing a sequence of q- 
expansions. We shall write ki below to denote a Pq-long form of a formula F .  The formula 
thus denoted is ambiguous only up to a renaming of bound variables. To see this, let 
Fl = Axl . . . Ax,.[H A1 . . . A,] and F2 = Ayl.. . . Ayn.[H1 B1 . . . B,] be two pq-long forms 
such that Fl A-conv F2. Observing that Fl and F2 must have the same A-normal forms, it 
is clear that Axl . . . Ax,. H = Ayl . . . . Ay,. HI, and hence m = n and r = s. Furthermore, 
for all i, 1 5 i 5 r ,  it must be the case that Axl . . . Axm.Ai A-conv Xyl . . . Aym.Bi. A simple 
argument by induction on the measure in Definition 5.1 then shows that Fl z F 2 .  This 
observation permits us to extend the measure ( to arbitrary formulas. For any formula F, 
we may define ((F) = ( ( F ) .  Given the uniqueness of ,617-long forms up to a-conversions 
and the fact that ((Fl) = ((F2) for any pq-long forms Fl and F2 such that Fl = F2, it 
follows that this extension of 6 is well-defined. 
Given any formula F and any substitution a, it is apparent that a (F)  = a ( ~ ) .  The 
interest in the prl-long form of representation of formulas stems from the fact that the 
effects of substitutions on formulas in this form can be analyzed easily. As an instance of 
this, we observe the following lemma that is the basis of the first phase of simplification in 
the search for unifiers for a given disagreement set. In this lemma, and in the rest of this 
section, we use the notation U(D) to denote the set of unifiers for a disagreement set 2). 
A proof of this lemma is contained in [15] and also in [25]. 
5.2. Lemma. Let Fl = &[HI Al . . . A,] and F2 = X2[H2 B1 . . . B,] be two rigid 
pq-long forms of the same type. Then a E U({(Fl, F2))) if and only if 
(i) H1 = H2 (and, therefore, r = s), and 
(ii) a E U({(X?.Ai, X2.B;) I 1 < i 5 r ) ) .  
Let us say that F is rigid (flexible) just in case is rigid (flexible), and let us refer 
to the arguments of F as the arguments of F. If Fl and F2 are two formulas of the same 
type, it is evident that pq-long forms of Fl and F2 must have binders of the same length. 
Furthermore, we may, by a sequence of a-conversions, arrange their binders to be identical. 
If Fl and F2 are both rigid, then Lemma 5.2 provides us a means for either determining 
that Fl and F2 have no unifiers or for reducing the problem of finding unifiers for Fl and F2 
to that of finding unifiers for the arguments of these formulas. This, in fact, is the nature 
of the simplification effected on a given unification problem by the function SIMPL. 
5.3. Definition. The function SIMPL on sets of disagreement pairs is defined as follows: 
(1) If D = 0 then SIMPL(D) = 0. 
(2) If 2, = {(Fl,F2)}, and 
(a) if Fl is a flexible formula then SIMPL(D) = 2); otherwise 
(b) if F2 is a flexible formula then SIMPL(D) = {(F2, Fl));  
(c) otherwise Fl and F2 are both rigid formulas. Let Az.[C1 A1 . . . A,] and Xz.[C2 
B1 . . . B,] be ,&-long forms for Fl and F2. If C1 # C2 then SIMPL(D) = F; 
otherwise SIMPL(2)) = SIMPL({(X2.Ai, X2.Bi) 1 1 5 i 5 r)).  
(3) Otherwise 2) has at least two members. Let D = {(Fi, Gi) I 1 < i 5 n).  
(a) If SIMPL({(Fi7 Gi))) = F for some i then SIMPL(D) = F; 
n 
(b) Otherwise SIMPL(2)) = U SIMPL({(F;, G;))). 
i=l 
Clearly, SIMPL transforms a given disagreement set into either the marker F or a 
disagreement set consisting solely of "flexible-flexible" or "flexible-rigid" formulas. By an 
abuse of terminology, we shall regard F as a disagreement set that has no unifiers. The 
intention, then, is that SIMPL transforms the given set into a simplified set that has the 
same unifiers. The following lemma shows that SIMPL achieves this purpose in a finite 
number of steps. 
5.4. Lemma. SIMPL is a total computable function on sets of disagreement pairs. 
Further, if 2) is a set of disagreement pairs then a E U(V) if and only if SIMPL(V) # F 
and a E U(SIMPL(V)). 
Proof. We define a measure 1C, on sets of disagreement pairs in the following fashion. If 
2, = {(Fi7Gi) ( 1 < i 5 n ) ,  then 
The lemma follows from Lemma 5.2 by an induction on this measure. I 
The first phase in the process of finding unifiers for a given disagreement set 2) thus 
consists of evaluating SIMPL(V). If the result of this is F, D has no unifiers. On the 
other hand, if the result is a set that is either empty or has only flexible-flexible pairs, at 
least one unifier can be provided easily for the set, as we shall see in the proof of Theorem 
5.14; such a set is, therefore, referred to as a solved set. If the set has at least one flexible- 
rigid pair, then a substitution for the head of the flexible formula needs to be considered 
so as to make the heads of the two formulas in the pair identical. There are essentially 
two kinds of "elementary" substitutions that may be employed for this purpose. The first 
kind of substitution is the one that makes the head of the flexible formula "imitate" that 
of the rigid formula. In the context of first-order terms this is, in fact, the only kind of 
substitution that needs to be considered. If the head of the flexible formula is a higher- 
order variable, however, there is also another possibility. This is that of "projecting" one 
of the arguments of the flexible formula into the head position, in the hope that the head 
of the resulting formula becomes identical to the head of the rigid one or may be made so 
by a subsequent substitution. There are, thus, a set of substitutions, each of which may be 
investigated separately as a component of a complete unifier. The purpose of the function 
MATCH that is defined below is to produce these substitutions. 
5.5. Definition. Let V be a set of variables, let Fl be a flexible formula, let F2 be a 
rigid formula of the same type as Fl, and let Xs.[f Al . . . A,], and XZ.[C B1 . . . B,] be 
prl-long forms of Fl and F2. Further, let the type of f be al -+ . . . -+ a, -, P, where ,f? is 
primitive and, for 1 < i 5 r ,  let w; be a variable of type a;. The functions IMIT, PROJ, 
and MATCH are then defined as follows: 
(i) If C is a variable (appearing also in z), then IMIT(Fl, F2, V) = 8 ;  otherwise 
IMIT(Fl, F2, V) = {{(  f, Awl . . . Aw,.[C [hl wl  . . . w,] . . . [h, wl . . . w,]])}}, 
where h l , . .  . , h, are variables of appropriate types not contained in V U {wl,. . . , w,). 
(ii) For 1 5 i 5 T ,  if ai is not of the form ,Bl -+ . . . -t pt -t ,B then PROJi(Fl, F 2 , V )  = 0; 
otherwise, 
PROJi(Fl, F2, V)  = {{(f, Awl . . . Awr.[wi [hl wl .  . . w,] . . . [ht wl . . . w~] ] ) ) ) ,  
where hl, . . . , ht are variables of appropriate type not contained in V U {wl,. . . , w,). 
(iii) MATCH(F1, F2, V) = IMIT(Fl, F2, V) U ( IJ PROJi(F17 F2, V)). 1Sisr 
The purpose of MATCH is to suggest a set of substitutions that may form "initial 
segments" of unifiers and, in this process, bring the search for a unifier closer to resolu- 
tion. To describe the sense in which MATCH achieves this purpose precisely, we need the 
following measure on substitutions: 
5.6. Definition. Let cp = {(fi, Ti) I 1 5 i 5 n )  be a substitution. We define a measure 
on c p  as follows: 
The correctness of MATCH is now stated in the lemma below. We omit a proof of 
this lemma, referring the interested reader to [15] or [25]. 
5.7. Lemma. Let V be a set of  variables, let Fl be a flexible formula and let F2 be 
a rigid formula of the same type as Fl. If there is a substitution a E U({(Fl,F2))) then 
there is a substitution cp E MATCH(Fl, F2, V) and a corresponding substitution a' such 
that 
(i) a =V 0' o c p ,  and 
(ii) .(a') < r(a1.t 
A unification procedure may now be described based on an iterative use of SIMPL 
and MATCH. A procedure that searches for a P-derivation, a notion that we describe 
next, actually embeds such a unification procedure within it. 
P-Derivations. Let the symbols 6, 27, 6 and V, perhaps with subscripts, denote sets 
of formulas of type o, disagreement sets, substitutions and sets of variables, respectively. 
The relation of being "P-derivable from" between tuples of the form (6, V, 0, V) is defined 
in the following manner. 
t This lemma may actually be strengthened: If f E V,  then there is exactly one c p  
corresponding to each a. 
5.8. Definition. Let P be a set of definite sentences. We say a tuple (G2, V2,02, V2) is 
P-derivable from the tuple (61, 101, 01, V1) if 'Dl # F and, in addition, one of the following 
situations holds: 
(1) (Goal reduction step) O2 = 0, V2 = Dl, and there is a goal formula G E 61 such that 
(a) G is T and G2 = 61 - {G) and V2 = V1, or 
(b) G is G1 A G2 and = (GI - {G)) U {GI, G2) and V2 = V1, or 
(c) G is G1 V G2 and, for i = 1 or i = 2, G2 = (GI - {G)) U {Gi) and V2 = Vl, or 
(d) G is C P and for some variable y 4 Vl it is the case that V2 = V1 U {y) and 
62 = (61 - {G)) U {Xnorm(Py)). 
(2) (Backchaining step) Let G E G1 be a rigid positive atom, and let D E P be such 
that D = Vx1. . . . Vxn.G1 3 A for some sequence of variables XI , .  . . , x, for which 
no x; E V1. Then O2 = 0, V2 = V1 U {XI , .  . . , x,), 6 2  = (61 - {G)) U {GI), and 
D2 = SIMPL(Dl U {(G, A ) ) ) .  
(3) (Unification step) Dl is not a solved set and for some flexible-rigid pair (Fl, F2) E Dl, 
either MATCH(Fl, F2, Vl) = 0 and D2 = F, or there is a a E MATCH(Fl, F2, V1) 
and it is the case that O2 = c, G2 = a(G1), D2 = SIMPL(a(D1)), and, if a = {(x,T)),  
V2 = V1 U F(T).  
Let us call a finite set of goal formulas a goal set, and a disagreement set that is 
F or consists solely of pairs of positive formulas a positive disagreement set. If G1 is a 
goal set and Dl is a positive disagreement set then it is clear, from an inspection of the 
above definition, the definitions 5.3 and 5.5, and the fact that a positive formula remains 
a positive formula under a positive substitution, that G2 is a goal set and V2 a positive 
disagreement set for any tuple (G2, D2, 02, V2) that is P-derivable from (61, Dl, 01, V l )  . 
5.9. Definition. Let 6 be a goal set. Then we say that a sequence (Gi7 Vi, 0i7 Vi)lli ln 
is a P-derivation sequence for G just in case = 6, V1 = F ( G 1  ), Dl = 0, 01 = 0, and, for 
1 5 i < n, (G;+l, ;Di+l, Bi+1, Vi+1) is P-derivable from (Gi, Vi, O;, V;). 
From our earlier observations, and an easy induction on the length of the sequence, it 
is clear that in a P-derivation sequence for a goal set 6 each G; is a goal set and each Vi 
is a positive disagreement set. We make implicit use of this observation in our discussions 
below. In particular, we intend unqualified uses of the symbols 6 and 2) to be read as 
syntactic variables for goal sets and positive disagreement sets, respectively. 
A P-derivation sequence (G;, Vi, Oi,  V;) - <i<n  - terminates, i. e. is not contained in a 
longer sequence, if 
(a) Gn is either empty or is a goal set consisting solely of flexible atoms and Dn is either 
empty or consists solely of flexible-flexible pairs, or 
(b) Dn = F. 
In the former case we say that it is a successfully terminated sequence. 
5.10. Definition. A P-derivation sequence, (G;, Di, Oi l  Vi)l<ilnl for G that is a success- 
fully terminated sequence is called a P-derivation of 6 and 6, o - . . o 61 is called its answer 
substitutzon. If 4 = {G) then we also say that the sequence is a P-derivation of G. 
5.11. Example. Let P be the set of definite sentences in Example 3.3. Further, let fl  
be a variable of type int + int and let G be the goal formula 
[map f un fl [cons 1 [cons 2 nil]] [cons [g 1 11 [cons [g 121 nil]]]. 
Then the tuple (61, Dl, 0, V1) is P-derivable from ({G), @ , 0 ,  { fl }) by a backchaining step, 
if 
Vl = {f1,f2,11,12,x}, 
GI = {[mapfunf21112]), and 
Dl = {(fl, f 2 ) ,  (x, I ) ,  ([fi X I ,  [g 1 I]), (11, [cons 2 nil]), (12, [cons [g 1 21 nil])}, 
where f 2 ,  11, 12, and x are variables. Similarly, if 
v2 = Vl u {hl,h,}, 
G2 = {[mapf un f2  11 12]}, 
02 = {(fl ,  Xw.[g [hl w][h2 w]])), and 
V2 = ((11, [cons 2 nil]), (12, [cons [g 121 nil]), (x, I ) ,  
( [ h l ~ l ,  I), ([h2 X I ,  1) 1 ( f 2 ,  Xw.[g [hl wl [h2 wll)), 
then the tuple (G2, V2, 02, V2) is P-derivable from (GI,  Dl, 0, V1) by a unification step. It 
is, in fact, obtained by picking the flexible-rigid pair ([ fl XI ,  [g 1 11) from V1 and using the 
substitution provided by IMIT for this pair. If the substitution provided by PROJl was 
picked instead, we would obtain the tuple (G2, F, {(fl, XW.~)} ,  V1). 
There are several P-derivations of G, and all of them have the same answer substitu- 
tion: {(fl, Xw.[g w I])}. 
5.12. Example. Let P be a set of definite sentences that contains the definite sentence 
Vx.[x > [P A]], where P and A are parameters of type int -+ o and int, respectively. Then, 
the following sequence of tuples constitutes a P-derivation of 3y.[P y]: 
Notice that this is a successfully terminated sequence, even though the final goal set 
contains a flexible atom. We shall see, in Theorem 5.14, that a goal set that contains 
only flexible atoms can be "solved" rather easily. In this particular case, for instance, the 
final goal set may be solved by applying the substitution { (x, T) ) to it. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, a P-derivation of a goal formula G is 
intended to be an object that demonstrates the provability of G from the set of definite 
sentences P. Our next endeavor, culminating in the Theorems 5.14 and 5.18, is to show 
that this notion is true to our intention. In the process, we shall see that a P-derivation of G 
encodes enough information to make it possible to extract the result of a computation. We 
shall also observe some properties of P-derivations that are of interest from the perspective 
of constructing a procedure that searches for such a derivation of a goal formula. 
5.13.Lemma. Let (G2,D2,02,V2) b e P - d e r i v a b l e f r ~ m ( ~ ~ , D ~ , O ~ , V ~ ) , a n d l e t D ~ # F .  
Further let o E U(D2) be a positive substitution such that every closed positive instance 
of the formulas in a(G2) is provable from P .  Then 
(i) a 0 82 E U(D1), and 
(ii) every closed positive instance of the formulas in a o 62 (61) is provable from P .  
Proof. The lemma is proved by considering the cases in Definition 5.9. 
A goal reduction or a backchaining step. In these cases O2 = 8 and so a o O2 = a. Further, 
in a goal reduction step D2 = Dl, and in a backchaining step Dl C_ 272. From these 
observations and the assumptions in the lemma, it follows that (i) is true. Similarly, it 
is clear that all the closed positive instances of a o 02(G) of each G E GI that is also an 
element of G2 are provable from P. To verify (ii), therefore, we only need to establish the 
truth of the previous statement for the case when the G E G1 is not in G2, and we do this 
below by considering the possibilities for such a G. 
In the case that G is T, the argument is obvious. If G is G1 V G2, then 
Thus the closed positive instances of a o 02(G) are of the form G' V GI' where GI and GI' 
are closed positive instances of a(G1) and a(G2) respectively. Noting that either a(G1) or 
a(G2) is an element of a(G2), the argument may be completed using the assumptions in 
the lemma and Theorem 4.14. A similar argument may be provided for the case when G 
is GI A G2.  
Before considering the remaining cases, we define a substitution that is parameterized 
by a substitution and a sequence of variables. Let c, be an arbitrary parameter of type 0. 
If y is a sequence of variables and S is a substitution, then 
Sg = {(x, c,) 1 x is a variable of type a such that x E .F(S o a(yi)) for some yi in y}. 
We note that if F is a positive formula all of whose free variables are included in the list 
jj and if S is a positive substitution, then Sji o S o o (F )  is a closed positive formula. 
Now let the G under consideration be C P .  Any closed positive instance of a o d2(G) 
may be written in the form C (6 o a (P ) )  for a suitable S; note that then S o a ( P )  must itself 
be a closed positive formula. From Definition 5.9, we see that, for some y, Xnorm(P y) E G2 
and hence a ( P  y) E a(G2). It is easily seen that Sy o S o a ( P  y) is a closed positive instance 
of a ( P  y) and is, therefore, provable from P. But now we observe that 
Using Theorem 4.14 it then follows that C ( 6  o a (P) ) ,  is provable from P .  The choice of S 
having been arbitrary, we may thus conclude that any closed positive instance of a o O2 (G) 
is provable from P .  
The only other case to consider is when G is removed by a backchaining step. In this 
case, by Definition 5.9 and Lemma 5.4, there must be a D E P such that 
DGV5? .G1>A?  G1EG2, and a ( G ) = a ( A ) .  
Once again, we observe that any closed positive instance of a o 02(G) may be written as 
S o a(G)  for a suitably chosen S. Now 6% o S o a(G1 > A) is a closed positive instance of 
G1 > A, and hence is a member of 17'1. Further, 
Finally, S,oSoa(G1) is evidently a closed positive instance of a(G1),and is therefore provable 
from P .  Using these facts in conjunction with Theorem 4.14 we may now conclude that 
S o a(G)  is provable from P .  
A unification step. We note first that V2 # F. Hence, in either of these cases, it follows 
from Lemma 5.4 that if a E U(D2) then a E U(02(D1)). But then, it is easy to see that 
a o d2 E U(D1). Since G2 = d2 (GI ) it is evident that every closed instance of a goal formula 
in a o d2 (61) is also a closed instance of a goal formula in a(G2). From this the second part 
of the lemma is obvious. I 
5.14. Theorem. (Soundness of P-derivations) Let (Gi, D,, Oi, Vi) <iln be a P-derivation 
of G, and let d be its answer substitution. Then there is a positive substitution a such 
that 
(i) a E U(D,), and 
(ii) all the closed positive instances of the goal formulas in ~ ( 6 , )  are provable from 'P. 
Further, if a is a positive substitution satisfying (i) and (ii), then every closed positive 
instance of a o d(G) is provable from P .  
Proof. The second part of the theorem follows easily from Lemma 5.13 and a backward 
induction on i, the index of each tuple in the given P-derivation sequence. For the first 
part we exhibit a substitution - that is a simple modification of the one in Lemma 3.5 in 
[15] - and then show that it satisfies the requirements. 
Let h, E Var, be a chosen variable for each atomic type a. Then for each type a we 
identify a formula E, in the following fashion: 
(a) If a is o, then E, = T. 
A (b) If a is an atomic type other than o, then E, = h,. 
(c) If a is the function type ,B1 -+ ... t ,Bk t ,B where ,B is an atomic type, then 
, = Ax. . . . AX k. Ep, where, for 1 5 i 5 k, xi is a variable of type Pi that is distinct 
from hPi . 
Now let y = {(y, E,) I y E Var,}. Finally, letting V = F(Gn)UF(Dn), we define o = y f V. 
We note that any goal formula in G, is of the form [P C1 . . . C,] where P is a variable 
whose type is of the form a1 t t a, -+ o. From this it is apparent that if G E 6, 
then any ground instance of a(G) is identical to T. Thus, it is clear that a satisfies (ii). 
If D, is empty then a E U(D,). Otherwise, let (Fl, F2) E D,. Since Fl and F2 are two 
flexible formulas, it may be seen that o(Fl) and a(F2) are of the form A y i .  . . . Ay;,. EP,, 
2 A  and Ayq.. . . Aym2 .Epn respectively, where Pi is a primitive type and $ {y;, . . . , yLi} 
for i = 1,2. Since Fl and F2 have the same types and substitution is a type preserving 
mapping, it is clear that ,B1 = ,B2, ml = m2 and, for 1 5 i < ml, y; and y8 are variables 
of the same type. But then evidently a(Fl) = o(F2). I 
In order to show a converse of the above theorem, we need the observation contained 
in the following lemma that may be verified by a routine inspection of Definition 5.9. 
5.15. Lemma. Let ( 6 2 ,  D2, 82, V2) be P-derivable from (GI, Dl, 01, VI ) and let 27 # F. 
Then V1 C V2 and if F(G1) U F(D1) C V1, then F ( G 2 )  U F(D2) C V2. 
We also need a measure of complexity corresponding to a goal set and a unifier. In 
defining such a measure, we use those introduced in Definitions 4.15 and 5.6. 
5.16. Definition. 
(i) Let G be a set of closed goal formulas. Then vp(6) = C pp(G). 
GEG 
(ii) Let be a set of goal formulas and let a be a positive substitution such that each 
formula in a(6)  is closed. Then ~ ~ ( 6 ,  a )  = (vp(a(G)), ~ ( a ) ) .  
(iii) 4 is the lexicographic ordering on the collection of pairs of natural numbers, i.e. 
(ml, nl)  4 (m2, n2) if either ml < m2 or ml = m2 and nl < n2. 
If 6 is a finite set of closed goal formulas such that each member of G is provable from 
P, then it is easily seen that vp(G) < w .  We make implicit use of this fact in the proof of 
the following lemma. 
5.17. Lemma. Let (GI, Dl, el, Vl) be a tuple that is not a terminated P-derivation 
sequence and for which .F(G1) U .F(D1) & Vl. Further, let there be a positive substitution 
a1 E U (Dl) such that, for each G1 E 61, a1 (GI) is a closed goal formula that is provable 
from P .  Then there is a tuple (G2, V2, 02, V2) that is P-derivable from (61, Dl, 81, V1) and 
a positive substitution a2 such that 
(ii) 01 =vl 0 2  o 82 
(iii) for each G2 E 62, u2(G2) is a closed goal formula that is ~rovable from P,  and 
(iv) ~ ( G 2 , 6 2 )  4 ~p(G1,  ~ 1 ) .  
In addition, when there are several tuples that are P-derivable from (61, Dl, 81, Vl ) ,  such 
a tuple and such a substitution exist for every choice of (1) the kind of step, (2) the 
goal formula in a goal reduction or backchaining step, and (3) the flexible-rigid pair in a 
unification step. 
Proof. Since (GI, Dl, 01, V1) is not a terminated P-derivation sequence, it is clear that 
there must be a tuple (G2, V2, 02, V2) that is P-derivable from it. We consider below the 
various ways in which such a tuple may result to show that there must exist a tuple, and a 
corresponding substitution, satisfying the requirements of the lemma. From this argument 
it will also be evident that this is the case no matter how the choices mentioned in the 
lemma are exercised. 
Goal reduct ion  step. If there is tuple that is P-derivable from (G1,V1,81, V l )  by such a 
step, then there must be a goal formula in G1 of the form T, G1 V G2, G1 A G2, or C P. 
Let us consider the first three cases first. In these cases, we let 
V2 = Dl, 82 = 0, V2 = Vl, and a 2  = a l .  
Since a1 E U(Vl), it is obvious that a 2  E U(D2). Further, a1 =,, a 2  o 82; in fact, 
a1 = a 2  o 82. Now we consider each of the cases in turn to provide a value for G2 that, 
toget her with the assignments provided above, meets the requirements of the lemma. 
(a) If T E 61, then let G2 = Gl -{TI. ( 6 2 ,  D2, 82, V2) is obviously a tuple that is P-derivable 
from (GI, Dl, el, V1). The observations above show that this tuple and a 2  satisfy con- 
ditions (i) and (ii) in the lemma. That (iii) is true follows from the facts that G2 2 G1 
and a2 = a l .  Observing additionally that P ~ ( T )  > 0, (iv) follows. 
(b) Let G1 V G2 E GI. We note here that 
and, further, that a2(G1) and a2(G2) are closed goal formulas. Using Theorem 4.14 
and the assumption that al(G1 VG2) is provable from P, we see that g2(Gi) is provable 
from P for i = 1 or i = 2. Further, by Lemma 4.16, it is the case that for the same i 
Setting 
62 = (61 - {GI V G2)) U {Gi), 
we obtain a tuple that is P-derivable from (61, Dl, 01, Vl) and that together with a 2  
satisfies the requirements in the lemma. 
(c) If GI A G2 E 61, let 6 2  = (61 - {GI A G2)) U {GI, G2). By arguments similar to those 
in (b), it follows that (61, Dl, el, V1) and a 2  meet the requirements in the lemma. 
The only case remaining is when C P E G1. Here we choose a variable y such that 
y $ V1, and let 
G2 = (61 - {C P ) )  u {Xnorm(P y)), D2 = Dl, 02 = @,and V2 = V1 U {y). 
Evidently (62, V2, 02, V2) is a tuple that is P-derivable from (GI, Dl, 01, V1). Now if we 
let P' = al (P), we see that C P' E al (GI). Thus, by assumption, P I  is a closed positive 
formula and C P I  is provable from P. From Theorem 4.14 and Lemma 4.16 it follows that 
there is a closed positive formula C such that P(P' C) is provable from P and, in fact, 
pp(p(P1 C)) < pF(C PI). Setting 
we see that ( 6 2 ,  V2, 02, V2) and a 2  meet the requirements in the lemma: Since y $! V1 and 
.F(V1) C VI, 0 2  E U(V2) and 01 =v,  02. Since .F(G1) Vl,  (iii) is satisfied for each 
G E G2 that is also in GI. For the only other G E 6 2 ,  i. e. Xnorm(P y ), it is apparent that 
a2(G) = P(P' C) and so (iii) is satisfied in this case too. From these observations and the 
fact that pP(p(P1 C)) < P ~ ( U ~ ( C  P)) ,  (iv) also follows. 
Backchaining step.  For this step to be applicable, there must be a rigid positive atom 
G E GI. Let G, = al(G). By assumption, G, is a closed positive atom that is provable 
from P .  Therefore, by Theorem 4.14, there must be a formula GI' > G, E (PI such that 
G" is provable from P; in fact, by Lemma 4.16, pp(G1I) < pp(Ga). Since GI1 > G, E 17'1, 
there must be a D E P such that 
where XI, .  . . , x, are not members of Vl, and a positive substitution for {xi, .  . . , x,) 
such that G, = y(A) and G" = y(G1). Now, setting 
D2 = SIMPL(V1 U ({(G, A))), V2 = V1 U {xi, - .  ., x,), 
we obtain the tuple (62, D2, 62, V2) that is P-derivable from (Gl,Vl,Ol, V1). Letting a 2  = 
a1 o cp, we see that this tuple and a2 also meet the requirements in the lemma: Since 
xi @ V1 for I 5 i 5 n, 
a1 =v, 0 2  =v, 02 002. 
Thus (ii) is satisfied. Also, since ?-(Dl) Vl , a 2  E U(D1). Noting that p(A) is a closed 
formula and that F(G)  C_ Vl, 
From these observations and Lemma 5.4, it is clear that 02 E U(D2), i. e. (i) is satisfied. 
Now, since F(&)  V1, a2(G1) = al(G1) for each G1 E G2 that is also in 61. Thus (iii) is 
true by assumption for such a G1. For the only other formula in G2, i .e.  G', this follows 
by observing that 
a2(G1) = cp(G1) = GI1; 
GI1 is by assumption provable from P. Finally, (iv) follows by observing that 
Unification step. For this case to be applicable, there must be a flexible-rigid pair in Dl. 
Let (Fl, F2) be an arbitrary such pair. By Lemma 5.7, there is a (positive) substitution 
cp E MATCH(Fl, F2, V1) and a (positive) substitution S such that a1 =,, 6 o p and T(S) < 
r (a l ) .  Setting 
G2 = p(Gi), v2 = SIMPL(cp(R)), 02 = p,  
and choosing V2 appropriately, we see that there is a tuple ( 5 2 ,  D2, 62, V2) that is P-derivable 
from (61, Dl , O1 , V1 ) . Letting a 2  = 6 we see easily that the other requirements of the lemma 
are also satisfied: Since .F(D1) 2 Vl, it is clear that 
Noting that a1 E U(D1), (i) follows from Lemma 5.4. (ii) is evidently true. Since F(G1)  
V1, we see that 
oi(G1) = 0 2  0 62(G1) = 02(62(G1)) = 02(G2)- 
That every G2 E a2(G2) is a closed goal formula that is provable from P now follows 
trivially from the assumptions. Finally 
5.18. Theorem. (Completeness of P-derivations) Let c p  be a closed positive substitution 
for the free variables of G such that cp(G) is provable from P. Then there is a P-derivation 
of G with an answer substitution 0 such that cp d F ( q  0. 
Proof. From Lemmas 5.17 and 5.15 and the assumption of the theorem, it is evident that 
there is a P-derivation sequence (Gi, Vi, Oi,  Vi) l< i  for {G) and a sequence of substitutions 
ai such that 
(ii) a;+l satisfies the equation ai =,i ai+l o 8i+l, 
(iii) ai E U (Vi), and 
(iv) ~p(Gi+l  , "i+l) 4 ~ p ( G i ,  oi). 
From (iv) and the definition of 4 it is clear that the sequence must terminate. From (iii) 
and Lemmas 5.4 and 5.7 it is evident, then, that it must be a successfully terminated 
sequence, i . e .  a P-derivation of G. Using (i), (ii) and Lemma 5.15, an induction on the 
length n of the sequence then reveals that cp 5 y, 0, o - . - o el. But F(G)  = V1 and 0,o. . . o 01 
is the answer substitution for the sequence. 1 
P-derivations, thus, provide the basis for describing the proof procedure that we de- 
sired at the outset. Given a goal formula G, such a procedure starts with the tuple 
({G), 0,0, F(G)) and constructs a P-derivation sequence. If the procedure performs an ex- 
haustive search, and if there is a proof of G from P, it will always succeed in constructing 
a P-derivation of G from which a result may be extracted. A breadth-first search may be 
inappropriate if the procedure is intended as an interpreter for a programming language 
based on our definite sentences. By virtue of Lemma 5.17, we see that there are certain 
cases in which the procedure may limit its choices without adverse effects. The following 
choices are, however, critical: 
(i) Choice of disjunct in a goal reduction step involving a disjunctive goal, 
(ii) Choice of definite sentence in a backchaining step, and 
(iii) Choice of substitution in a unification step. 
When it encounters such choices, the procedure may, with an accompanying loss of com- 
pleteness, perform a depth-first search with backtracking. The particular manner in which 
to exercise these choices is very much an empirical question, a question to be settled only 
by experiment at ion. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have concerned ourselves with the provision of higher-order features 
within logic programming. An approach that has been espoused elsewhere in this regard 
is to leave the basis of first-order logic programming languages unchanged and to provide 
some of the functionality of higher-order features through special mechanisms built into the 
interpreter. This approach is exemplified by the presence of "extra-logical" predicates such 
as univ and functor in most current implementations of Prolog [32]. While this approach 
has the advantage that usable "higher-order" extensions may be provided rapidly, it has 
the drawbacks that the logical basis of the resulting language is no longer clear and, 
further, that the true nature and utility of higher-order features within logic programming 
is obscured. 
We have explored an alternative approach based on strengthening the underlying logic. 
In a precise sense, we have abstracted out those properties of first-order Horn clauses that 
appear to be essential to their computational interpretation, and have described a class of 
higher-order formulas that retain these properties. Towards realizing a higher-order logic 
programming language based on these formulas, we have also discussed the structure of a 
theorem-proving procedure for them. These results have been used elsewhere [21, 251 in 
the description of a language called AProlog. Although space does not permit a detailed 
discussion of this language, it needs to be mentioned that an experimental implementation 
for it exists, and has in fact been widely distributed. This implementation has, among 
other things, provided us with insights into the practical aspects of the trade-offs to be 
made in designing an actual theorem-proving procedure based on the discussions in Section 
5 [25]. Its existence has also stimulated research into applications of the truly novel feature 
of the extension discussed in this paper: the use of A-terms as data structures in a logic 
programming language. 
This work has suggested several questions of both a theoretical and a practical na- 
ture, some of which are currently being examined. One theoretical question that has been 
addressed is that of providing for a stronger use of logical connectives within logic program- 
ming. Our approach in this regard has been to understand the desired "search" semantics 
for each logical connective and to then identify classes of formulas within appropriately 
chosen proofs systems that permit a match between the declarative and search-related 
meanings for the connectives. One extension along these lines to the classical theory of 
Horn clauses is provided by the intuitionistic theory of hereditary Harrop formulas. The 
first-order version of these formulas is presented in [18, 191 and the higher-order version 
is discussed in detail in [23]. These formulas result from allowing certain occurrences 
of universal quantifiers and implications into goals and program clauses and provide the 
means for realizing new notions of abstractions within logic programming. The higher- 
order version of hereditary Harrop formulas has been incorporated into the current version 
of AProlog [27] and has provided significant enrichments to it as a programming language. 
A second theoretical issue is the provision of a richer term language within AProlog. 
The use of simply typed A-terms has turned out to be a limiting factor in the programming 
context, and we have therefore incorporated a form of polymorphism inspired by ML [ll, 
241. A complete theoretical analysis for this extension is, however, yet to be provided. 
Further, there is reason to believe that a term language that permits an explicit quantifi- 
cation over types, e.g. the one discussed in [8], may be a better choice in this context. In 
a similar vein, a richer term language like the one provided in [30], may also be considered 
as the basis for the data structures of AProlog. 
Among the practical questions, an important one that is being addressed is the de- 
scription of an efficient implementation for a AProlog-like language [26]. The key pursuit 
in this respect is to devise data structures for A-terms that will support reasonable im- 
plement ations of the reduction mechanism of functional programming on the one hand, 
and of the unification and backchaining mechanisms of logic programming on the other. 
Another issue of interest is the harnessing of the richness added to the logic programming 
paradigm by the use of A-terms as data structures. As already indicated, ongoing research 
has been focused on exploiting such a language in areas that include theorem proving, type 
inference, program transformation, and computational linguisit ics. 
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